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For a policy maker promoting the end of a harmful tradition, conformist social influence is a
compelling mechanism. If an intervention convinces enough people to abandon the tradition,
this can spill over and induce others to follow. A key objective is thus to activate spillovers
and amplify an intervention’s effects. With female genital cutting as a motivating example,
we develop empirically informed analytical and simulation models to examine this idea. Even
if conformity pervades decision making, spillovers can range from irrelevant to indispensable.
Our analysis highlights three considerations. First, ordinary forms of individual heterogeneity
can severely limit spillovers, and understanding the heterogeneity in a population is essential.
Second, although interventions often target biased samples of the population, targeting a rep-
resentative sample is a more robust approach to spillovers. Finally, if the harmful tradition
contributes to group identity, spillovers can hinge critically on disrupting the link between
identity and tradition.
Introduction
Harmful traditions create a basic conflict1. They reflect the values and traditions of their respective cul-
tures2,3, and tolerance of cultural differences implies some degree of acceptance. In contrast, a commitment
to cross-cultural standards like universal human rights4 and the idea that cultures can evolve in destructive
ways5 suggests exactly the opposite response. A policy maker who favours the latter view can intervene to
disrupt a harmful tradition and steer cultural change in an alternative direction. In doing so, however, the
policy maker stands in direct opposition to the norms and values of the target population3. This is the basic
conflict of applied cultural evolution.
Conformist social influence provides an appealing mechanism for managing this conflict, and it has gen-
erated considerable interest as a policy tool in various domains1,6–8. Specifically, if decision makers have
an interest in behaving like those around them, a policy maker can potentially recruit this individual-level
mechanism to amplify the effects of an intervention at the aggregate level. In such cases, the intervention has
a direct effect that leads some agents to change because of exposure to the intervention proper. An indirect
effect also obtains if the initial change among a subset of agents provokes others to follow without further
interference. We refer to these indirect effects as “spillovers”.
To the extent that spillovers are responsible for changes in behaviour, change is endogenous. Endogenous
change limits the need for the policy maker to meddle directly in the culture of the target population.
This could reduce the cost of reversing a harmful tradition, increase the perceived legitimacy of change,
reduce the tendency for people to conclude their culture is under attack, and reduce inter-cultural strife
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and the associated risk of backlash. Spillovers hold much appeal for these reasons, and their potential
informs policy related to female genital cutting2,3,9–12, child marriage3,13–15, open defecation11,16, domestic
violence12,17, and a preference for sons12. Research has also highlighted the role of social influence, and in
some cases its policy relevance, with respect to smoking18, foot binding19, alcohol consumption20, duelling21,
obesity22, bullying behaviour23, energy conservation24, tax compliance25, and freshwater conservation26,27.
In the following, with female genital cutting as a motivating example, we examine both the potential and
the potential limitations of spillovers. In particular, we detail why aggregate-level spillovers, a prominent
objective of programmes promoting the abandonment of cutting3,12, may or may not follow from conformist
social influence at the individual level.
Cutting takes various forms, but it is often a serious and potentially dangerous procedure that involves
significant tissue removal and possibly infibulation28. The scale of the practice is also daunting. Current
estimates place the number of cut females in the world at far beyond 100 million, with an estimated three
million girls at risk of cutting each year28. Because the scale is so vast, endogenous spillovers may in fact be
necessary to end female genital cutting, and cutting provides an archetypical example of how policy makers
hope to use spillovers to shape cultural evolution in ways consistent with their objectives3,10.
Importantly, however, recent empirical studies on cutting suggest a fundamental caveat. Many families
seem to have an interest in conforming to the local practice in terms of whether or not they cut their
daughters3,29–33. This kind of conformist social influence is an important mechanism for generating spillovers,
which suggests that programmes promoting the abandonment of cutting are right to consider potential
spillovers. Even so, attitudes and practices related to cutting are quite heterogeneous at extremely local
scales12,29–31,34. As we show below, this mix implies that conformist decision making at the individual level,
though present, may not be creating opportunities to trigger significant spillovers12,30,31. With this as our
point of departure, we develop several models to examine the following key question. How do various forms
of heterogeneity combine with an overall emphasis on conformity to affect the scope for spillovers?
Before turning to these models, we present a simple illustration to cultivate intuition. Assume a population
of agents. Think of these agents as decision-making parents who decide whether or not to cut. We treat
the family as a single decision-making unit with a unified position at a given point in time. A family may
change its position through time, but at any given point in time the family is either a cutting family or a
non-cutting family. Parents in a cutting family cut any daughters, and they socialise any sons to value cut
wives. Parents in a non-cutting family do not cut their daughters, and they socialise any sons to value uncut
wives. In this way, we categorize a family as cutting or non-cutting regardless of the exact composition of
girls and boys. This assumption is consistent, in particular, with recent research showing that parents have
the same view of cutting in reference to both their daughters and the wives of their sons35.
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Each family is subject to social influence in the sense that the family is increasingly likely to abandon
cutting as the proportion of families who do not cut increases. Aside from this common interest in behaving
like others, families vary. Consistent with experimental studies on conformity36–39 and with data on cut-
ting3,31,40, families differ in terms of how strongly they respond to information about the behaviour of others
(Fig. 1a). We assume two types of family, a type that responds strongly to information about others and a
somewhat less responsive type. As a thought exercise, imagine we can manipulate the proportion of families
of the less responsive type. As the less responsive type becomes more common, the stable equilibria converge
on a uniform mix of cutting and non-cutting families. This means cutting practices become increasingly het-
erogeneous and less norm-like in equilibrium (Fig. 1b). By extension, the potential to incite the endogenous
abandonment of cutting via spillovers diminishes and eventually disappears altogether (Fig. 1b). As we show
below with more realistic models, this kind of generic result arises often. Social influence may be pervasive,
but the scope for inciting beneficial spillovers can vary tremendously when people are heterogeneous in other
ways.
We begin with a simple model that assumes everyone is the same, and we progressively incorporate
different forms of heterogeneity known to be important. A longstanding hypothesis is that families face
incentives to coordinate their choices related to cutting. These incentives create a situation in which people
conform, and spillovers are thus possible19. Coordination incentives related to cutting can take various
forms9, but empirical studies indicate that marriageability concerns are important3,31,33,41. To illustrate,
consider a society in which people cut their daughters to signal that these girls will one day become morally
upright and sexually faithful wives41. Any given family in such a society faces powerful incentives to cut its
daughters and to value cut wives for its sons. Because of the shared understanding of what cutting signals,
a family’s best option is to cut so that other families perceive the family’s daughters as good potential wives
and mothers. The family’s incentives also favour cut wives for its sons. Otherwise, the family would invite
the perception that its sons are destined to raise the children of other men.
In contrast, imagine a society in which people do not associate cutting with sexual fidelity. Families have
no incentive to cut their daughters, and they have no incentive to demand uncut wives for their sons. In
effect, families can avoid the health risks of cutting without signalling that their daughters are untrustworthy.
Moreover, uncut wives for a family’s sons ensure that daughters-in-law give birth without undue complica-
tions, granddaughters are themselves likely to avoid risks associated with cutting, and all of this without the
family’s sons carrying the stigma of presumed cuckolds.
Coordination incentives mean that, when parents consider the future husbands and wives of their daugh-
ters and sons, the expected values of cutting and not cutting vary according to how common the practices
are19,32. If cutting is sufficiently common, cutting is a family’s best choice because the probability of a future
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marriage with a cutting family is relatively high. If not cutting is sufficiently common, the opposite holds.
The transition between these two cases occurs at an indifference point. An indifference point is the specific
proportion of non-cutting families that renders a focal family indifferent between cutting and not cutting.
At this indifference point, the expected value of cutting is the same as that of not cutting.
When preferences related to the intrinsic value of cutting are homogeneous, every family has the same
indifference point, which we label q̃. To generate cultural change, assume each family evaluates its current
practice occasionally and updates if necessary. Let qt be the proportion of families not cutting at time t.
A family who updates chooses with certainty the option that maximises expected payoffs given the current
distribution of behaviours in the population. If the proportion choosing not to cut is less than q̃ but greater
than zero, updating families choose to cut, and the proportion not cutting declines through time (i.e. for
some t′ > t, qt′ < qt). If the proportion not cutting is greater than q̃ but less than one, updating families
choose not to cut, and the proportion not cutting rises through time (i.e. for some t′ > t, qt′ > qt).
This model holds clear implications for a policy maker who wants to promote the abandonment of cutting.
If not cutting is sufficiently rare, then cutting has the highest expected value, and families choose accordingly.
The population converges to a self-reinforcing equilibrium in which everyone cuts. Coordination incentives
work against the policy objective. However, if not cutting is sufficiently common, then not cutting has the
highest expected value. The population converges to a self-reinforcing equilibrium in which no one cuts.
Coordination incentives work in favour of the policy objective. The common indifference point, q̃, separates
these two regimes. q̃ is itself an equilibrium, but it is not stable. Any small deviation from q̃ sets the
population on a path towards either widespread cutting or widespread abandonment, and for this reason q̃
is sometimes called a “tipping point”.
If the policy maker designs and implements an intervention, whatever it may be, that convinces any
proportion of families greater than q̃ to abandon cutting, coordination incentives take over and lead all
remaining families to stop cutting. This is perhaps the canonical model of how a policy maker can recruit
endogenous social forces to do her bidding. Designing an effective intervention can be difficult, but any
adequate intervention triggers spillovers that eventually result in a complete transition to abandonment.
Once the policy maker has triggered these spillovers, she can move on to some other task even if many
families still cut. She has crossed the tipping point, and endogenous forces have taken over.
What if, however, in addition to every family’s shared interest in coordinating, families also vary in terms
of the intrinsic values42–44 they attach to cutting? For example, some families may be preoccupied with the
health risks of cutting33. These families want to coordinate, but they would prefer to coordinate on not
cutting as opposed to cutting. Other families may have fully internalised the notion that cutting is necessary
for girls to grow up and become morally upright women33. These families also want to coordinate, but they
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would prefer to coordinate on cutting. All in all, any given family has a ranking over the pure-strategy
equilibria of the underlying coordination game and a ranking over the costs of deviating from the different
equilibria. Families disagree, however, about these rankings. Recent empirical work on cutting3,30,31,33,45
has provided strong support for the existence of such preference heterogeneity.
This kind of heterogeneity means that different families, whatever their reasons, have different indifference
points. Heterogeneity of this sort can have stark consequences. If F is the cumulative distribution function
for indifference points, and if each family evaluates its practice in every period and updates if necessary, the
proportion not cutting evolves according to qt+1 = F (qt). This is a classic result
42,46 interpreted here in
terms of female genital cutting12.
Importantly, depending on the shape of F , a tipping point may or may not exist, and this is true even
though everyone responds strongly to coordination incentives (Supplementary Information, e.g. Supplemen-
tary Figs. 3-14). In particular, by assumption each agent either deterministically follows a sufficiently large
majority that cuts or a sufficiently large majority that does not cut. In this sense, all agents are strong con-
formists. Agents vary, however, in terms of the values of qt that induce them to switch from one behaviour
to the other. We refer to these values as “thresholds”, which can be interpreted as indifference points under
coordination incentives. The structure of threshold heterogeneity controls whether or not coordination in-
centives and the associated tendency to conform create a tipping point. This is important because the policy
maker’s concern does not centre around the existence of coordination incentives per se, but rather around
the potential for endogenous cultural change. The former concerns decision making at the individual level;
the latter concerns dynamics at the population level.
Heterogeneity shapes the potential for social influence to drive spillovers, and this point raises a number
of fundamental policy questions. Accordingly, we add a number of mechanisms known to be important
to the basic model (Supplementary Information) and examine how these mechanisms interact with policy
choices to affect spillovers. First, we assume that individuals who respond to the intervention change their
preferences12,33 and abandon cutting unconditionally. Their threshold values go to zero, which effectively
creates a subset of the population unequivocally committed to abandonment. Recent research shows that an
unequivocally committed minority of this sort can tip a population to a new state in which everyone adopts
a new opinion or behaviour47,48. These are fascinating results based on a game involving pure coordination
incentives49 in which coordinating on any given option is equivalent to coordinating on any other option. In
contrast, as explained above, we assume that equilibria can be ranked, and decision makers vary in terms of
their rankings. This is consistent with empirical research on cutting3,12,29–31, and more broadly we suspect
that, when harmful traditions involve coordination incentives, associated equilibria will often be ranked.
Otherwise, behaviour change would be relatively straightforward precisely because decision makers would
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find the policy maker’s target equilibrium just as good as the past tradition.
In our case, the intervention creates a committed subpopulation embedded in a larger population of agents
with heterogeneous preferences. The intervention thus shifts the threshold distribution in ways that may or
may not affect the potential for spillovers, with the details depending on which segment of the population
an intervention targets. We consider interventions that target a sample of the population that is relatively
amenable to the abandonment of cutting, a randomly selected sample, or a sample relatively resistant to
abandonment.
Second, we introduce the assumption that, as agents become increasingly resistant to abandonment,
they are decreasingly likely to respond to the intervention. Our own fieldwork in Sudan provides strong
evidence for this assumption33, as does fieldwork from other countries3. Third, we introduce various degrees
of homophily. Homophily is ubiquitous in human societies50, and in our case homophily means that agents
are most likely to associate with others having initially similar attitudes towards cutting. Finally, we turn to
a model in which families link their cultural identities to their cutting practices. This model reflects recent
research showing that female genital cutting is, to some extent, a matter of group identity3,9,12,32. In all
cases, to quantify and standardise endogenous changes in behaviour, we normalise spillovers by scaling the
endogenous change that actually occurs by the maximum endogenous change that could occur (Methods).
Results
Spillovers under alternative intervention targets and heterogeneous responses to
the intervention
We begin with the case in which everyone is connected, and everyone targeted by the intervention responds
in the sense that they abandon cutting unconditionally. With intervention in hand, the policy maker has two
decisions to make, the size of the intervention and whom to target (Supplementary Information). Specifically,
the policy maker targets a proportion φ of the population, and targeted individuals are directly exposed to
the intervention. Given φ, we assume the policy maker can target amenable agents, randomly selected agents,
or resistant agents. Agents amenable to abandonment are amenable in the sense that their pre-intervention
thresholds are relatively low. A random sample, in contrast, means the intervention target is not subject to
selection bias, and in particular the policy maker selects the target without regard for threshold values. A
resistant target, finally, consists of agents with relatively high threshold values.
In terms of generating spillovers, we show analytically (Supplementary Information) that targeting ran-
domly selected agents cannot be worse than targeting amenable agents, and it will often be strictly better.
Analogously, targeting resistant agents cannot be worse than targeting randomly selected agents, and it will
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often be strictly better. Intuitively, if the policy maker targets amenable agents, she uses her exogenous inter-
vention to accomplish the easiest possible task, which is to convince those agents most amenable to change to
abandon cutting. This, in turn, leaves the most difficult possible task to endogenous spillovers, and spillovers
are limited as a result. A random sample moderates this problem because it tends to exclude some amenable
agents from the intervention and to include some resistant agents. Change via the exogenous intervention
might increase in difficulty because of the latter effect, but we ignore this for the moment by assuming that
everyone responds to the intervention. This leaves only the effect that a random sample improves conditions
for spillovers because it tends to exclude some agents amenable to change. These amenable agents are thus
available to abandon cutting via endogenous spillovers. Targeting the most resistant agents continues in the
same vein. A resistant target takes the most challenging conceivable task for the intervention, and it leaves
the easiest conceivable task for spillovers. Fig. 2 illustrates the logic by showing an example of how the three
types of target change F in different ways, with potentially profound consequences for cultural evolution and
spillovers.
Fig. 3a presents simulation results that summarise these patterns under a wide array of conditions. In
particular, a random target promotes spillovers under a wider range of conditions than an amenable target,
and a resistant target promotes spillovers under a wider range of conditions than a random target. These
differences are most pronounced when the exogenous intervention is large (e.g. φ = 0.5, Fig. 3a).
Strikingly, however, these differences in spillovers pale in comparison to the differences that arise from
variation in pre-existing preferences. Regardless of whether the intervention is small or large, and regardless
of the intervention target, the one factor with an overriding effect on spillovers is the distribution of thresholds
before the intervention. If this distribution is right skewed (Fig. 3a, above 45◦ line), most people are amenable
to the abandonment of cutting before the policy maker enters the scene, and endogenous spillovers are always
pronounced. If the distribution is left skewed (Fig. 3a, below 45◦ line), most people are initially resistant to
abandonment when the policy maker appears, and endogenous spillovers are largely absent. Spillovers are
only sensitive to the choices available to the policy maker, namely the size and target of the intervention,
when the distribution of threshold values is sufficiently close to symmetric. Other distributions mean the
policy maker can promote abandonment via the size of the exogenous intervention, but her choices have
surprisingly little effect on endogenous spillovers.
We next add the assumption that agents initially resistant to abandonment are relatively unlikely to
respond to the intervention (Supplementary Information). This means that in expectation, with an interven-
tion of size φ, some proportion of agents less than φ changes due to the intervention. Importantly, a recent
field experiment in 122 communities in Sudan found exactly this pattern33. The participants most in favour
of cutting before the intervention were least likely to respond to the intervention. Adding this mechanism to
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a population of heterogeneous agents reduces the scope for a policy maker to influence spillovers (Fig. 2g-2i,
Fig. 3b).
In particular, we argued above that, when the pre-existing distribution of preferences neither strongly
favours nor strongly disfavours change, the policy maker can improve spillovers by targeting individuals
resistant to abandonment. Such a strategy effectively reserves the difficult cases for the intervention and the
easy cases for spillovers. This is precisely why targeting resistant agents can foster spillovers. However, if
resistant agents do not respond to the intervention, perhaps because budgetary constraints ensure that the
intervention is just not enough to convince them, then many of the gains from targeting resistant agents
are lost. Indeed, when responses to the intervention are heterogeneous, our results indicate that the policy
maker’s ability to influence spillovers by choosing the size and target of the intervention may be almost
entirely absent (Fig. 3b). This is especially true for moderate and large interventions (0.2 ≤ φ ≤ 0.5), where
spillovers are largely independent of the policy maker’s choices. Importantly, this result does not imply that
the policy maker cannot influence the number of people who abandon cutting. A large expensive intervention
can still convince more families to abandon than a small underfunded intervention via the direct effect of
the intervention. The result does imply, however, that the ability to influence spillovers can be surprisingly
beyond the policy maker’s grasp. This is quite different from results involving a pure coordination game in
a population with homogeneous preferences, a setting in which the size of the committed minority is a key
consideration48.
Spillovers in homophilous networks
Adding homophilous social structure erodes the potential for spillovers, but the effects are not monotonic.
Adding homophily also reveals the potentially robust advantages of targeting a random sample of the pop-
ulation. Specifically, even moderate degrees of homophily can destroy spillovers under otherwise favourable
conditions. For example, consider the case in which everyone targeted by the intervention abandons cutting
unconditionally. If everyone is connected and the pre-intervention distribution of thresholds is approxi-
mately symmetric, a resistant target often leads to large spillovers (Fig. 3a). Moderate homophily reduces
these spillovers substantially (Fig. 4a), and a stronger degree of homophily destroys them entirely (Fig. 4b).
Broadly speaking, the damaging effects of homophily are especially noticeable if the intervention targets ei-
ther an amenable or resistant segment of the population, and a random target often generates spillovers more
robustly than either type of biased sample. In effect, because homophily fragments the population to some
extent, an intervention directed at a random sample of agents is likely to seed each of the various fragments
with some families who abandon cutting. This helps attenuate some of the detrimental effects of homophily
on spillovers.
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Importantly, however, homophily is not uniformly detrimental. To show precisely how variation in the
degree of homophily can affect spillovers, we simulated many different degrees of homophily under a symmetric
distribution of threshold values (Beta(3.375, 3.375)), which is a case in which the initial distribution of
preferences should allow other mechanisms to have clear effects on spillovers. We begin with the case in
which all agents targeted by the intervention respond to the intervention. The effects of homophily are
complex (Fig. 5). Under a resistant target, increasing homophily decreases spillovers regardless of the size
of the intervention (Fig. 5e-5f). In contrast, for small interventions (e.g. φ = 0.1) that target amenable and
random samples (Fig. 5a-5d), any degree of homophily is better for spillovers than no homophily at all. That
said, even in these cases spillovers tend to reach their maximum value when homophily is weak (e.g. Fig. 5d);
further increases in homophily reduce spillovers.
Homophily, in short, has countervailing effects51. First, it fragments the population, and so the abandon-
ment of cutting does not necessarily need to be common in the entire population before spillovers take over.
Instead, abandonment might only need to gain a foothold in a local fragment, at which point abandonment
can spread within the fragment before spreading to other fragments51,52. Homophily, however, has a sec-
ond effect. Fragmentation can also hinder the diffusion of abandonment from one fragment to another51,53.
For small interventions that target amenable or random samples, the foothold effect dominates (Fig. 5a-5d,
φ ∈ {0.1, 0.2}). This finding is consistent with analytical results that effectively assume vanishingly small
interventions51. Otherwise, limited diffusion between fragments dominates, and increasing homophily leads
to declining spillovers (Fig. 5). Overall the analysis also clearly shows that, when homophily is present,
random targets generate considerably larger spillovers than amenable or resistant targets (Fig. 5).
When we add the assumption that agents resistant to change are relatively unlikely to respond to the
intervention, the effects of homophily are similar. In particular, when comparing some degree of homophily
to no homophily, spillovers can sometimes be larger when homophily is present (Fig. 6a-6d). More broadly,
however, increasing homophily leads to decreasing spillovers, and in this sense homophily can hinder the
abandonment of cutting via endogenous social mechanisms. Indeed, when homophily and heterogeneous
responses to the intervention combine, spillovers are typically small or absent altogether (Fig. 6). Whatever
the potential for spillovers, the policy maker again does best by targeting a random sample.
Spillovers when harmful traditions are tied to group identity
In 1956 in the Meru district of Kenya, a council of local male leaders, widely seen as the compliant pawns of
colonising forces, banned female genital cutting. Over the next three years, thousands of individuals defied
the ban, often at great expense to their families, and in many cases girls took matters into their own hands
by using razor blades to cut each other54. Although the mechanisms at work were no doubt varied and
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complex, defiance of the ban was in part an assertion of cultural identity in the face of a threat from an
outside influence54. The Meru story is perhaps uniquely arresting, but the significance of identity concerns is
not. Empirical research indicates that cutting often serves as a means of defining, asserting, and maintaining
group identity2,3,9,12,32,55, and more broadly agents sometimes reject international norms related to human
rights to signal their identification with a local culture56.
We now incorporate identity concerns of this sort by dividing the population into two groups (Methods
and Supplementary Information). Each agent responds to the distribution of behaviours in her own group
with probability β ∈ [0.5, 1]. Conditional on a response to the ingroup, agents tend to conform to the majority
choice, and this ingroup conformity can be relatively weak or strong (γij , see Methods). With probability
1 − β, an agent responds to the distribution of behaviours in the other group. Conditional on a response
to the outgroup, agents tend to adopt the minority choice, and this outgroup anti-conformity can also be
relatively weak or strong (µij , see Methods). β thus summarises the emphasis agents place on responding
to their own group, typically in a conformist fashion, versus responding to the outgroup, typically in an
anti-conformist fashion that serves to establish and maintain a distinct group identity.
Analytical results show that, after an intervention of size φ, two types of stable equilibria can exist. One
type involves the two groups stabilising on exactly the same mix of cutting and non-cutting families. This
shared distribution of behaviours represents a balance between responding to the ingroup (β) and responding
to the outgroup (1−β), and the two groups are paradoxically identical in equilibrium. For many equilibria of
this sort, the stable proportion of families who do not cut is larger than the exogenous intervention (φ), and
in this sense spillovers can occur provided the intervention tips the population into the basin of attraction for
this equilibrium. That said, an increasing tendency to respond to the outgroup (β → 0.5+) lowers the shared
equilibrium proportion of families not cutting, and in this way group identity concerns place important limits
on spillovers (Supplementary Information, Supplementary Figs. 27-33, 39, 45-47).
The other type of stable equilibrium involves the two groups converging on two distinct traditions, with
one group cutting at a high rate and the other group cutting at a low rate. Equilibria of this sort often
appear, all else equal, as responses to the ingroup (β) decrease in frequency, and responses to the outgroup
(1 − β) increase in frequency (Supplementary Information, Supplementary Figs. 33-34, 37-40, 42, 44-46).
Equilibria of this sort are fundamentally incompatible with large spillovers because one group commits to
the harmful tradition to distinguish itself.
Simulation results with heterogeneous agents in a finite population confirm the general conclusion that
an emphasis on group identity is generally devastating for spillovers. Under a restricted set of circumstances,
a tendency to respond to the outgroup can actually facilitate spillovers. This effect, however, only occurs
when the intervention is small and, conditional on an agent responding to the ingroup, ingroup conformity
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is strong (Fig. 7e-7h, φ = 0.1). The overall pattern, however, is one in which an increasing emphasis on
responding to the outgroup (declining β) dramatically reduces the potential for a policy maker to precipitate
spillovers (Fig. 7). Indeed, as agents approach an equal emphasis on responding to the ingroup versus the
outgroup (β = 0.5), substantial proportions of agents who could abandon cutting endogenously do not do
so. Thus, a policy maker confronting a strong link between a harmful tradition and group identity should
develop strategies for destabilizing this link as it severely limits the scope for inducing endogenous beneficial
changes in culture.
Discussion
As cultures mix with increasing frequency, conflicts involving irreconcilable viewpoints are inevitable3. Ul-
timately, social and economic forces will almost certainly lead some traditions in some cultures to give way.
That said, policy makers can resolve conflicts in ways that respect cultural differences, relatively speaking,
to the extent that change is endogenous to the target population. This principle captures much of the policy
appeal of tipping points and path-dependent changes in culture. The policy maker does not necessarily need
draconian measures like criminalising female genital cutting57,58. Rather, the policy maker needs an effective
intervention, delimited in time and space, to place the target population on a new cultural path consistent
with policy objectives. The policy maker, in effect, wants to help people help themselves.
The appeal is clear, but the link between the psychology of social decision making and cultural change
is varied and elaborate. Ample empirical evidence shows that decision makers are subject to positive social
influence27,38,59, but this is not necessarily useful to the policy maker. For example, when deciding whether
to cut, families want to follow the trend around them to some extent29,31,32. This positive social effect at
the family level, however, only comes into its own as a policy lever if it generates scope for spillovers at
the aggregate level. Importantly, when positive social influence mixes with run-of-the-mill heterogeneity,
spillovers can range from the utterly trivial to the truly spectacular. For this reason, estimating the scope
for recruiting endogenous social mechanisms to advance behaviour change is crucial. Table 1 summarises the
mechanisms examined and their effects. Here we turn to four associated principles to consider when aiming
to trigger endogenous change.
First, the distribution of behaviours can provide the policy maker with clues about social influence and
spillovers. A target population initially comprised of a locally heterogeneous mix, with many agents choosing
the harmful option and many choosing some alternative12,30,31, may not be a population suitable for gen-
erating spillovers. Local heterogeneity suggests that people are routinely mixing with others who think and
behave differently. If endogenous social influence was going to send the population off in one direction or
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another, it very well may have done so by the time the policy maker first arrives on the scene.
In contrast, if the harmful practice is locally pervasive, at least two possibilities hold. Either the target
population is in the harmful equilibrium of a path-dependent process, or an intrinsic preference for the
harmful behaviour ensures that the only stable equilibrium is harmful. In the former case, the policy maker
needs a delimited intervention to push the population across the tipping point. Whatever the intervention
may be, the hope is that social influence can help the policy maker avoid a protracted and potentially heavy-
handed campaign. In the latter case, the policy maker must find out why members of the target population
prefer a seemingly harmful option and how she can effectively change this preference. Moreover, she must do
so without risking backlash by activating any tendency for people to view their cultural identities as under
threat3,12,54. In situations of this kind, path dependence and multiple equilibria are irrelevant.
Second, coordination incentives with heterogeneous preferences support a diverse array of outcomes, but
targeting a random sample of agents should generate spillovers more reliably than a biased sample. In general,
people will differ in terms of their preferences, their likely response to a policy maker’s intervention, and their
networks. When people are heterogeneous in these ways, spillovers can range from the utterly trivial to
the truly spectacular, and this remains true even if everyone has a shared interest in coordinating. Simply
knowing that coordination incentives are widespread is not enough, and the risk is that the policy maker
assumes spillovers can help her promote change when in reality they cannot.
Interestingly, when coordination incentives are pervasive in a heterogeneous population, our results suggest
that a randomly selected target offers the most robust approach to sparking spillovers. A random target also
has an important practical advantage. Namely, even if the policy maker does not have the option to survey
the distribution of preferences in the target population ex ante, she can still target a random sample. She
simply needs to avoid selection bias. Of particular significance, an amenable target is probably the worst
strategy if the goal is to generate spillovers. An amenable target essentially takes the easiest possible task
for the intervention and reserves the hardest possible task for endogenous social mechanisms. In spite of
this, programmes promoting the abandonment of cutting have a tradition of working with individuals and
communities favourable towards abandonment3,11,12.
Third, when a concern for group identity is helping to sustain a harmful tradition, the policy maker should
attempt to weaken the link between tradition and identity. When a group relies on the harmful practice to
construct and maintain a distinct cultural identity, social influence is parochial. This means a focal decision
maker wants to be like ingroup members but unlike outgroup members. The link between tradition and
identity adds intrinsic value to the harmful practice for a subset of the population. This value, in turn, works
against spillovers under nearly all conditions. In such a situation, the policy maker should consider strategies
to curtail the effects of parochial social influence.
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As one approach, she can accept that distinct groups within the target population want to construct
oppositional identities, but she can try to transfer this dynamic to some new decision-making domain with
reduced potential for harm. Candidate domains are likely to be highly idiosyncratic and specific to the
groups in question. Generically, however, the hope is that the alternative choice domain will provide a new
and relatively innocuous basis for groups to distinguish themselves. To the extent that the harmful practice
is a traditional component of group identity, this strategy may be difficult. Moreover, as the example from
the Meru district of Kenya illustrates, an especially challenging scenario occurs when the target population
takes the policy maker and her foreign constituency as the relevant outgroup3,12. Transferring concerns about
cultural identity to some other decision-making domain may be impossible in such cases precisely because
the policy maker herself has established the harmful practice as an issue of central importance.
Alternatively, the policy maker can attempt to convince agents they do not need to construct oppositional
identities. In this case, the policy maker faces two distinct but linked challenges. She must ensure that all
groups abandon their parochial stance, and having done so she must specifically convince the groups with
the harmful tradition to join the others. For the various reasons outlined above, mobilising social effects to
induce endogenous change can be a formidable challenge in its own right. With parochialism in the mix,
the challenge is doubly serious because outgroup anti-conformity typically compromises the potential for
beneficial spillovers, and when strong it places significant constraints on behaviour change among agents not
directly exposed to the intervention. For these reasons, if a harmful practice like cutting is an important
component of group identity, the policy maker cannot rely on endogenous change without also addressing
the fact that agents use the harmful practice to define themselves culturally.
Fourth, pre-existing preferences are pivotal in terms of what the policy maker can expect from social
influence. Specifically, we have shown that spillovers hinge critically on the initial distribution of preferences
in the target population and the details of how an intervention transforms this distribution. That said,
in the analyses above an exogenous intervention reduces thresholds to zero for some families. Subsequent
spillovers are limited to changes in behaviour; endogenous changes in preferences do not occur. However,
if social influence were also to support endogeneous preference change, the spread of preferences favouring
abandonment could be a powerful mechanism in its own right12. For this to be true, the cultural evolution of
preferences would have to be somehow congruent with but different from the cultural evolution of behaviour.
Specifically, if preferences and behaviour always change in unison, preference change is redundant from a
policy perspective. Imagine, however, that preferences and choices both respond to changes in the frequency
of families who do not cut, but preference change and behaviour change are somehow different. This would
introduce the possibility that some families first change their preferences in favour of abandonment, only
to abandon cutting later when the population crosses the new reduced threshold values for these families.
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This additional path to behaviour change could improve conditions for spillovers, but outcomes should again
depend on the precise details of how an intervention interacts with the pre-existing characteristics of the
target population.
Analogous complexities should apply to interventions that convince opinion leaders to abandon a harmful
practice. Fieldwork on cutting3 suggests that, when prominent members of an ingroup or outgroup voice
their support for abandonment, the effect can go either way. If people view the call for abandonment as
legitimate and genuine, and if they take the opinion leader as a valid normative model, the contribution to
abandonment can be significant. However, if people feel the call for abandonment represents pandering to
outside forces, or if the opinion leader does not provide a valid normative example, the effect can actually
reinforce the commitment to cutting, as in the Meru example above.
Aside from the possible significance of endogenous preference change and influential individuals, our
results have specific limitations to bear in mind. To motivate our assumptions, we have turned to empirical
studies on cutting with data from Senegal to Sudan, from Switzerland to Kenya. This diversity mirrors the
extensive geographic span of cutting. Because of this diversity, the mix of social mechanisms that supports
cutting, and that could potentially contribute to cutting’s decline, may vary considerably from one location to
another. Consequently, our focus on mechanisms rooted in coordination and conformity may be more or less
relevant in one location versus another. Indeed, aside from individual heterogeneity in conformist tendencies
within a culture, recent research has also shown variation in generic tendencies to conform across cultures60.
We have emphasized coordination and conformity in part because they have been highly influential in policy
discussions. Coordination and conformity can, under the right circumstances, stabilize multiple outcomes, at
least one of which the policy maker disfavours and at least one of which the policy maker favours. Aside from
coordination and conformity, however, a vast number of other social mechanisms and psychological biases
may operate when people influence each other and learn from each other. For many mechanisms and biases,
the aggregate consequences remain unexplored.
All in all, conformity and coordination incentives at the individual level can translate into aggregate
behavioural dynamics in diverse and subtle ways. Mundane forms of heterogeneity are crucial. If people vary
in terms of whom they know and how they react to these people, conformity and coordination can support
the abandonment of a harmful practice via spillovers, they can hinder change, or they can do nothing at all.
At present, we have considerable evidence that conformity and coordination affect the choices families make
about cutting31,32. We also, however, have considerable evidence for local heterogeneity in attitudes and
practices related to cutting30,31. This is a combination that should lead policy makers to hope that spillovers
are possible but worry that they may not be reliable, and indeed recent research finds little evidence for
spillovers12,58.
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Spillovers are attractive in a world where cultures increasingly mix, and thus cultural conflicts are likely
to be common. Any strategy that can manage these conflicts without one culture steamrolling another is
a welcome strategy. Nonetheless, exploiting the potential of spillovers will require a concentrated effort to
measure and evaluate how social influence and everyday heterogeneity combine to support the endogenous
abandonment of harmful traditions like female genital cutting.
Methods
The characteristic normalised spillover
To standardise endogenous outcomes regardless of the size of an intervention, we normalise spillovers by
accounting for the scale of the policy maker’s intervention. Consider a set of independent populations,
S. S could be a set of disjoint communities for empirical work, but here we will often treat S as a set
of 200 independent populations whose cultural evolutionary dynamics we have simulated (Supplementary
Information). For any s ∈ S, let q̂s be the long-run proportion of agents who do not cut after endogenous
changes have run their course in the wake of the intervention, and the population has re-stabilised. We define






[q̂s > φ](q̂s − φ)
1− φ
+




where |·| is set cardinality, and [·] are Iverson brackets. In effect, the final outcome in each population is
normalised as a number between -1 and 1. Negative outcomes (i.e. (q̂s−φ)/φ ∈ [−1, 0)) occur, for example, if
the proportion of decision makers choosing not to cut actually decreases after the intervention. The extreme
value of -1 would occur if all agents initially cut, some agents abandon cutting in response to the intervention,
but they return to cutting after the intervention ends. A value of 0 occurs if the proportion who do not cut
after the intervention stabilises on the intervention size (i.e. q̂s = φ). Such a value arises, for example, if
all agents initially cut, targeted agents abandon cutting in response to the intervention, and no one changes
their choices after the intervention. Positive outcomes occur (i.e. (q̂s−φ)/(1−φ) ∈ (0, 1]) if the proportion of
decision makers choosing not to cut increases due to spillovers after the intervention ends. The extreme value
of 1 would occur if all agents initially cut, some abandon cutting because of the intervention, and everyone
else follows after the intervention ends. For the characteristic normalised spillover, we average normalised
outcomes and take either this average or zero according to which is larger.
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Spillovers under alternative intervention targets and heterogeneous responses to
the intervention
For simulations (Supplementary Information), we consider 121 different initial threshold distributions (Sup-
plementary Information, Supplementary Fig. 15), five different values of φ ranging from 0.1 to 0.5, and
the three different intervention strategies (amenable, random, resistant). For agent i, with pre-intervention
threshold qi, we assume the agent responds to the intervention with probability h(qi) = 1 − cqi, where
c ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}.
We modelled homophily in three different ways (Supplementary Information). In all cases, homophily
has the following generic feature. As the pre-intervention thresholds for two agents become increasingly far
apart, the probability the two agents are connected to each other declines. We consider various degrees
of homophily, from extremely weak to strong. As homophily becomes increasingly strong, the population
becomes increasingly fragmented. As a result, agents only know about the choices of some people in the
population.
Importantly, the detrimental effects of homophily do not occur simply because homophily fragments the
population. As a kind of benchmark, we repeated the exercise shown in Figs. 5-6, but we used random net-
works with linkage probabilities ranging from zero to one. Spillovers tend to be larger under random networks
than under homophilous networks. Moreover, the detrimental effects of fragmentation typically only appear,
quite suddenly, as the linkage probability gets close to zero (Supplementary Information, Supplementary
Fig. 25-26). This is very different from the broadly detrimental effects of homophily (Figs. 5-6).
Spillovers when harmful traditions are tied to group identity
Assume the population consists of two groups (Supplementary Information). At a given point in time, each
family evaluates its current practice, whether cutting or not cutting, and chooses either to retain its current
practice or change. When doing so, a family can either respond to the ingroup distribution of choices or to
the outgroup distribution. Specifically, use i to index family and j to index group. Let the choice of i in
j in period t be a Bernoulli random variable, Yijt, such that Yijt = 1 indicates not cutting, and Yijt = 0
indicates cutting. Let Xijt be a Bernoulli random variable such that Xijt = 1 indicates the family responds
to the ingroup distribution of choices, while Xijt = 0 indicates a response to the outgroup. Let qjt indicate
the proportion of families in j not cutting in t.
With probability β ∈ [0.5, 1], a family bases its current choice on the ingroup distribution of behaviours,
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i.e. P (Xijt = 1) = β. When doing so, families tend to conform to the majority choice,






jt + (1− qjt)
γij
, (2)
where aij , bij ∈ [0, 1], āj < b̄j , γij ≥ 0, and γ̄j > 1. Larger values of γ̄j yield, given a response to the ingroup,
relatively strong ingroup conformity. Because āj < b̄j and γ̄j > 1, ingroup responses tend to be positively
sloped sigmoidal functions that homogenise choices within groups, whether cutting or not cutting. If this
ingroup conformity was the only relevant mechanism (i.e. β = 1), the result would be multiple equilibria,
tipping points, and ample scope for endogenous spillovers.
With probability 1 − β, a family bases its current choice on the outgroup distribution of behaviours,
i.e. P (Xijt = 0) = 1 − β. When doing so, families typically take the majority choice in the outgroup as an
indication of what not to do,






j′t + (1− qj′t)
µij
, (3)
where cij , dij ∈ [0, 1], c̄j > d̄j , µij ≥ 0, and µ̄j > 1. In addition, j 6= j
′, which simply means (3) is an
outgroup response. Larger values of µ̄j yield, given a response to the outgroup, relatively strong outgroup
anti-conformity. This outgroup anti-conformity represents an effort to establish and maintain distinct group
identities by using, with probability 1 − β, the outgroup majority as an example of how not to behave.
This follows from c̄j > d̄j and µ̄j > 1, which ensures that out-group responses tend to be negatively sloped
sigmoidal functions.
The intervention targets a proportion φ. All targeted agents abandon unconditionally (i.e. aij , bij , cij , dij =
1), and thus φ is a lower bound on the proportion not cutting after the intervention. When β is close to one,
the two groups are approximately independent of each other, and no one cares much if the two groups have
traditions that are different or similar. As β approaches 0.5, however, group identity becomes increasingly
important, and when β = 0.5 ingroup conformity and outgroup anti-conformity are equally important.
With this structure in place, we model cultural evolutionary dynamics in two ways (Supplementary Infor-
mation). First, we assume an infinitely large population of agents who are homogeneous. This simplification
allows us to treat cultural evolutionary dynamics as deterministic, and we use a mix of analytical and graph-
ical techniques to analyse the model. Second, we assume a finite population of heterogeneous agents. We
consider a variety of distributions for controlling heterogeneity, but given the question of interest we focus on
cases in which the expected response to the ingroup is to conform to the majority and the expected response
to the outgroup is to anti-conform. A large empirical literature on cultural transmission shows that people
use ingroup conformist strategies, and in some cases outgroup anti-conformist strategies61, but these strate-
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gies tend to be highly variable36–39,62,63. For this reason, we simulate cultural evolutionary dynamics under
a wide array of parameter values for controlling these strategies, and we focus attention on results robust to
this variation. For a given combination of parameter values, we simulate 200 independent populations and
use the results to estimate the characteristic normalised spillover.
To identify the conditions depicted in Fig. 7, we ran an initial set of simulations to find the strength of
ingroup conformity (γ̄j) that leads to the largest spillovers when group identity concerns are absent (β = 1).
We then chose a range of γ̄j and µ̄j values in the vicinity of the spillover-maximizing γ̄j value. We varied γ̄j
and µ̄j values independently, and for any combination of values we simulated cultural evolution for β from
1.0 down to 0.5. Fig. 7 summarises results from this exercise for intervention sizes from φ = 0.1 to φ = 0.5.
Code availability
Code is available as Supplementary Software with related details in the Supplementary Information and the
Supplementary Software Guide.
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Figure 1: Heterogeneity and spillovers. a, Assume the target population consists of two types. A focal
decision maker of either type is more likely to choose not cutting with increases in the proportion of decision
makers who do not cut, and for either type this response exhibits the sigmoidal shape associated with path-
dependent dynamics59,64 and potential spillovers. The two types vary in terms of how responsive to social
information they are31,36, with one type more responsive than the other. b, Solid lines show stable steady
states as a function of how common the less responsive type is, and the dashed line shows the unstable steady
state. Arrows show the direction of cultural evolution. When two stable steady states exist, pushing the
population from the lower stable steady state across the unstable steady state should induce a transition to
the upper stable steady state, with the maximum possible spillover shown in purple. As the less responsive
type becomes more common in the population, all stable steady states converge on the one steady state
supported by this type. The potential for beneficial spillovers declines until it disappears altogether. More
broadly, the structure of heterogeneity controls the extent to which the policy maker can rely on endogenous
cultural change.
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Figure 2: Variation in intervention targets. a-c, An example density function showing the distribution
of threshold values before the intervention. d-i, Associated cumulative distribution functions after the in-
tervention when everyone targeted responds (d-f) and when the probability of responding declines linearly
with an agent’s initial threshold value (g-i). Cumulative distribution functions specify cultural evolutionary
dynamics, i.e. qt+1 = F (qt). F (qt) > qt implies an increase in abandonment, F (qt) < qt an increase in cutting.
a, d, The intervention targets 20% of agents (d, vertical dashed line) with the lowest initial threshold values
(a, shaded region). They abandon cutting unconditionally. 20% not cutting becomes a stable equilibrium as
a result, and no spillovers occur. b, e, The intervention targets a random sample constituting 20% of agents.
The cumulative distribution function shifts upwards, in this example clearing the 45◦ line. The only stable
outcome is for everyone to abandon cutting, thus yielding the maximum possible spillover. c, f, A resistant
target is similar, but the upwards shift is larger still. g-i, The proportion responding to the intervention (red
vertical dashed lines) is less than the proportion targeted (black vertical dashed lines). This can eliminate










































































Figure 3: The dominant effects of pre-existing preferences. Squares vary in terms of which segment of
the population the intervention targets (amenable to change, random, resistant to change) and the size of the
intervention ({10%, 20%, . . . , 50%}). Each square shows simulation results under 121 different distributions
of initial threshold values. Specifically, threshold values before the intervention are distributed Beta(α, β)
(Supplementary Information, Supplementary Fig. 15). In the lower left quadrant of a square, distributions
are bimodal. Above the 45◦ line, distributions are skewed right and thus favour abandonment. Below
this line, distributions are skewed left and disfavour abandonment. Distributions along the 45◦ line are
symmetric and neither favour nor disfavour abandonment. Colour intensity (red or blue) indicates the
size of the characteristic normalised spillover, and thus white indicates no spillovers. Red signifies that
spillovers are unimodally distributed across simulated populations of 500 agents each, and blue signifies
a multimodal distribution. a, Fully connected networks in which everyone targeted by the intervention
responds. Results show that the pre-existing threshold distribution has a dominant effect on spillovers. If
this pre-existing distribution is approximately symmetric, the policy maker’s choices also matter, and she
does best by targeting agents resistant to change. b, Fully connected networks in which the probability of
responding to the intervention decreases with an agent’s initial threshold value. This heterogeneous response










































































Figure 4: Limited spillovers under homophily. As in Fig. 3, each square shows results under 121 different
distributions of initial threshold values. Specifically, threshold values before the intervention are distributed
Beta(α, β) (Supplementary Information, Supplementary Fig. 15). Distributions above the 45◦ line favour
abandonment, while distributions below this line do not. Squares vary in terms of both intervention targets
(amenable, random, resistant) and the size of the intervention ({10%, 20%, . . . , 50%}). Colour intensity (red
or blue) indicates characteristic normalised spillover values, with white meaning no spillovers. Red signifies
a unimodal distribution of outcomes across simulated populations of 500 agents and blue a multimodal
distribution. a, Moderately homophilous networks in which agents tend to link to others with similar initial
threshold values, and the expected number of links per agent is 50.4. b, Strongly homophilous networks in
which the expected number of links per agent is 5.5. Results indicate that a random target is the most robust
approach to fostering spillovers under homophily.
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Figure 5: The joint effects of selection bias and homophily. Each panel shows characteristic nor-
malised spillovers as a function of homophily (i.e. θ in Supplementary Information). Panels vary in terms
of whether the intervention targets agents amenable for change (a-b), randomly selected agents (c-d), or
agents resistant to change (e-f). The total number of agents is either 100 (a, c, e) or 500 (b, d, f). In-
terventions vary from 10% (green) to 50% (blue) of the population in increments of 10%. Targeted agents
unconditionally adopt the policy maker’s desired behaviour. Open circles indicate a unimodal distribution of
outcomes across simulated populations. Closed circles indicate a multimodal distribution. Homophily tends
to reduce beneficial spillovers. However, targeting a random sample of agents dramatically attenuates this
effect compared to the biased selection associated with targeting amenable or resistant agents.
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Figure 6: Combining heterogeneous responses to the intervention with selection bias and ho-
mophily. As in Fig. 5, each panel shows characteristic normalised spillovers as a function of homophily (i.e. θ
in Supplementary Information). Panels vary in terms of intervention targets (a-b, amenable; c-d, random;
e-f, resistant) and the total number of agents (a, c, e, 100; b, d, f, 500). Interventions vary from 10%
(green) to 50% (blue) of the population in increments of 10%. Open circles indicate a unimodal distribution
of outcomes across simulated populations. Closed circles indicate a multimodal distribution. Like Fig. 5,
the results here show the joint effects of selection bias and homophily. Here we add the assumption that
agents are decreasingly likely to respond to the intervention as initial threshold values increase, and thus only
some agents targeted by the intervention adopt the policy maker’s desired behaviour. This further reduces
spillovers (cf. Fig. 5), but randomly selecting agents again moderates the effect.
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Emphasis on own group
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Figure 7: Group identity as a drag on beneficial change. As the emphasis on responding to one’s
ingroup (β, see Methods) declines, and by extension the emphasis on distinguishing one’s own group from
the outgroup (1 − β) increases, spillovers decrease. Graphs show the characteristic normalised spillover in
populations of 100 (a, c, e, g) and 500 agents (b, d, f, h). Interventions vary from 10% (green) to 50% (blue)
of the population in increments of 10%. Targeted agents unconditionally adopt the policy maker’s desired
behaviour. Conditional on responding to the ingroup, ingroup conformity (γ̄j , see Methods) is relatively
weak (a-d) or strong (e-f). Conditional on responding to the outgroup, outgroup anti-conformity (µ̄j , see
Methods) is also relatively weak (a-b, e-f) or strong (c-d, g-h). Open circles indicate a unimodal distribution
of outcomes and closed circles multimodal.
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Table 1: Key questions about underlying mechanisms with policy implications and relevant citations.
Key question about under-
lying mechanism
Implications References
What are the consequences
for spillovers when every-
one responds to information
about the frequencies of dif-
ferent behaviours, but peo-
ple vary in their sensitivity
to this information?
As less sensitive types become more common,
the scope for spillovers declines (Fig. 1). Signif-
icant spillovers depend on a sizeable proportion
of agents who are highly sensitive. The policy
maker should thus identify how important con-
formity and coordination are to different types of
decision maker in the target population.
Efferson et al. (2015)31 use an anonymous self-
administered questionnaire to show that, within
Sudanese communities, people vary markedly in
terms of the importance they attach to coordi-
nated cutting practices. Communities also vary
from each other in that the importance of coor-
dination predominates in some but not in oth-
ers. More generally, experimental designs like
those in Muthukrishna et al. (2016)38 and Efferson
and Vogt (2018)39 identify heterogeneity in con-
formist strategies and any associated tendency to
homogenise attitudes and behaviour.
How do spillovers depend on
pre-intervention heterogene-
ity in preferences related to
the harmful practice and its
beneficial alternative?
Spillovers tend to be reliably large if most deci-
sion makers are amenable to a change in favour
of the beneficial behaviour and routinely absent
if most decision makers are opposed to change
(Fig. 3). Spillovers are most sensitive to policy
choices if pre-existing preferences neither favour
nor disfavour change. The policy maker needs re-
liable data, uncompromised by social desirability
bias65, on the distribution of attitudes and pref-
erences in the target population.
Hayford (2005)29, Bellemare et al. (2015)30, Ef-
ferson et al. (2015)31, Cloward (2016)3, Vogt et
al. (2017)45, Gibson et al. (2018)35, and Plat-
teau et al. (2018)12 present evidence for and dis-
cuss the implications of locally heterogeneous atti-
tudes and preferences related to cutting. Efferson
et al. (2015)31, de Cao and Lutz34, and Gibson et
al. (2018)35 present methods designed to reduce so-
cial desirability bias when identifying attitudes and
preferences related to cutting.
How do spillovers vary,
based on which segment of
the population the policy
maker targets, when either
(i) the intervention is uni-
formly effective for all mem-
bers of the population or (ii)
the intervention has an ef-
fect that declines as agents
become more resistant to
change?
If the intervention is uniformly effective, target-
ing a random sample of the population is better
for spillovers than an amenable sample, and a
resistant sample is better than a random sample
(See Fig. 2a - 2f, Fig. 3a, and Supplementary In-
formation). If the intervention has a declining
effect, the advantages of a resistant target are
lost, and a random target will tend to maximise
spillovers (See Fig. 2g - 2i, Fig. 3b, and Sup-
plementary Information). An amenable target is
likely to minimize spillovers.
Mackie et al. (2015)11 recommend an amenable
target. Cloward (2016)3 presents evidence sug-
gesting both the tendency of development organ-
isations to target individuals amenable to change
and the limitations of such an intervention strat-
egy. Vogt et al. (2016)33 conducted a randomised
field experiment in 122 communities in Sudan and
found that participants who initially had relatively
favourable attitudes towards uncut girls responded
to the intervention, while participants with initially
unfavourable attitudes did not.
How does homophily af-
fect spillovers, where ho-
mophily means that people
with similar preferences be-
fore the intervention tend to
be linked?
For small interventions, spillovers are larger un-
der some degree of homophily than under no ho-
mophily at all (e.g. Fig. 5d, light green line).
More broadly, however, increasing homophily
tends to reduce spillovers, especially for relatively
large interventions (Figs. 5-6 and Supplementary
Information). An intervention that targets a ran-
dom sample of the population is better for induc-
ing spillovers than either an amenable or a resis-
tant target (Fig. 5-6). The intervention strategy
should accordingly avoid selection bias and at-
tempt to improve information flow in the popu-
lation.
McPherson et al. (2001)50 review homophily in
social networks and its implications. Apicella et
al. (2012)66, Shakya et al. (2015)16, and Migliano
et al. (2017)67 present innovative methods for iden-
tifying network structure in field settings. Centola
(2011)68 uses an online experiment to assess how
homophily affects the diffusion of a low-cost inno-
vation related to health. Cloward (2016)3 discusses
how selection bias, specifically amenable targets,
can hinder programmes promoting the abandon-
ment of cutting.
With respect to spillovers,
what are the effects of a sit-
uation in which some groups
use the harmful tradition to
create and maintain a dis-
tinct cultural identity?
Under most conditions, using the harmful prac-
tice and its beneficial alternative as a way to de-
fine group identities and maintain group bound-
aries can severely constrain spillovers at the pop-
ulation level (Fig. 7 and Supplementary Informa-
tion). The intervention strategy should strive to
weaken the link between identity and tradition
without provoking backlash or casting the policy
maker as the salient outgroup.
Shell Duncan and Hernlund (2000)2, Thomas
(2000)54, Gruenbaum (2001)55, Cloward (2016)3,
Howard and Gibson (2017)32, and Platteau et
al. (2018)12 examine the link between cutting and
identity (e.g. gender, ethnicity, culture), along with
the challenges this link can pose to programmes
promoting abandonment.
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